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Integrating User Identity to Ethereum Smart Contract Wallet 
 
Abstract: 
The first major application of the blockchain technology was made for cryptocurrencies and 
by now it is used in numerous industries, including in energy, agriculture, manufacturing, 
etc. The original idea of transferring assets from one account to another has to be updated 
for those industries. Non-financial industries have a different definition of an asset and a 
differing attitude towards the anonymity of the users, i.e. it is necessary for the users and 
their wallets to become more public. 
Namely, the main problem is related to the users' anonymity and uncontrolled asset transfers 
in decentralized applications. In this thesis, the user’s identity is connected with his 
blockchain wallet to allow asset transfers to take place only with added identity-based 
signatures of the approver and the user himself. The implementation of the thesis includes 
the analysis of the Ethereum blockchain principles, different wallet protection solutions and 
state-level identity services. The thesis proposes a specification of an identity-based wallet 
integration with Dapp. The solution specification is validated using Dapp and a smart-
contract prototype. 
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Kasutaja Identiteedi Integreerimine Ethereum Nutika Lepingu 
Rahakotiga 
 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Esimene suurem rakendusplokiahela tehnoloogias oli krüptovaluuta ja selle vahendamine, 
praeguseks on aga plokiahela tehnoloogia leidnud kasutust paljudes teistes 
tööstusvaldkondades nagu energeetika, põllumajandus, tootmine jt. Algne idee, mis hõlmas 
varade saatmist ühelt anonüümselt kontolt teisele, vajab uuendusi lähtuvalt uute 
valdkondade vajadustest. Mittefinantssektorites võib vara määratlus olla erinev ning 
suhtumine kasutajate anonüümsusesse samuti s.t, et kasutaja ja tema rahakott muutuvad 
sellisel juhul avalikumaks. 
Peamine probleem seisneb kasutaja anonüümsuses ja varade saatmise üle kontrolli 
puudumises. Antud lõputöös me ühendame kasutaja identiteedi tema plokiahela rahakotiga 
selleks, et lubada varade saatmist alles peale digitaalset signeerimist kinnitaja ja kasutaja 
enda poolt. Lõputöö käigus analüüsitakse Ethereum plokiahela põhimõtteid, erinevaid 
plokiahela rahakoti kaitselahendusi ja riigi poolt väljastatud identiteedil baseeruvad e-
identimise teenuseid. Lõputöö tulemusena esitatakse identiteedi põhise rahakoti ja 
detsentraliseeritud rakenduse integreerimise spetsifikatsiooni. Töö tulemuse 
valideerimiseks on kasutatud prototüüpi detsentraliseeritud rakendusest ja plokiahela 
nutilepingust. 
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1 Introduction 
Blockchain technologies are decentralized systems, originally developed for transferring 
digital currencies. Currently, there are many potential applications of this technology in 
different kinds of industries, for example, energy market agreements and agriculture supply 
chain (Al-Jaroodi & Mohamed, 2019). Blockchain technology is gaining use in such 
industries because of its tamper resistance, making hacking practically impossible. In case 
of currency transactions, users regard anonymity of public blockchain systems as one of the 
key characteristics to avoid being publicly linked to their assets for safety reasons. Assets 
in blockchain are stored in wallets, which are protected using users’ private keys. As private 
keys give control over wallets, there are many solutions developed to secure private keys. 
These solutions have usability problems, for example USB based solutions require a specific 
software and a computer to access the wallet. In addition, very few of them connect the 
blockchain wallet to users’ identity, which makes it difficult for companies using blockchain 
technologies to support their customers in case of any issues.  
In one hand, anonymity is important for safety reasons and, in the other hand, platforms that 
are using public blockchain technology as part of their system are facing difficulties with 
supporting and protecting their users’ interests due to the anonymity of the latter. In non-
financial industries, where blockchain is used due to its decentralization, persistency and 
auditability characteristics, the definition of an asset can be different. In such cases, the fact 
that the users and their wallets become more public, because their tradable assets have 
merely a prospective promissory value, may not constitute a problem in itself. Also, these 
solutions may have no possibility to transfer the referred assets with just having access to 
the wallet, because additional approvals of another user or service are required. To 
implement that, a solution is required for identifying users to enable multiple-step approvals 
or connections to such solutions. 
One of such solutions is required by WePower Network, which has a platform that uses an 
Ethereum blockchain decentralized application. There is a need to have users with verified 
identity on this platform to provide trust for electricity purchase agreements on the platform. 
To operate on state level in Estonia, it is required to have the identity verification service on 
the same level as is performed by the state-issued digital identity verification service 
provider in Estonia. The decentralized application itself is using Ethereum blockchain 
wallets to make asset transactions between the users. The assets themselves contain 
agreements between the users of the platform.  
To give a better understanding of the problem context we will go through a simple example 
visualized in Figure 1. The problem originates from the electricity domain, which might be 
hard to understand. To make it somewhat clearer and simpler, we will explain electricity 
through the example of water. Provided that we have an app that holds agreements between 
A and B during a specified period of time. Let us assume that this contains a daily drinking 
water supply agreement and there is lack of water in the state. We have a policy that limits 
the amount of water for each participant, for example to three buckets for participant A. The 
participant B is a producer of drinking water and needs to supply all the produced water 
each day, otherwise having to pay a penalty due to regulatory rules. The app needs to verify 
that all of the produced water from B is covered by the supply agreement, so that there is no 
waste nor over-deliveries. To ensure auditability and storage of data in a distributed way 
across the globe, the app uses Ethereum blockchain. The aim of the application is to sustain 
control over the water supply agreements and ensure that the participants will not be 
breaching applicable policies. If agreements were made between two participants only with 
no third-party verification it would be difficult to guarantee that the agreements did not 
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violate the relevant policies. However, in case of under- or over-delivery (i.e. a breach of 
the agreement), the enforcement of the aggrieved party's rights would be hindered due to 
the agreement having been signed in blockchain where users are anonymous.  
 
Figure 1 Blockchain application with agreement assets 
The goal of this thesis is to propose a solution that ensures user wallet security and gives 
additional value to decentralized applications by identifying anonymous users with verified 
identity. An additional goal is to allow the transfer of assets between users with the 
acceptance of the decentralized application approver signature.  
The scope of the thesis is an Ethereum blockchain based application, the integration of user’s 
identity verification and signing service and the development of approver functionality. The 
main question is how to connect the user’s identity to the wallet in a way that transactions 
can be made only after identity-based signature verification. For more detailed answer we 
separated the main question into sub questions:  
• SQ1 How to make the decentralized application know who is making the transactions? 
• SQ2 How to associate an asset transfer with the user’s identity? 
• SQ3 How to integrate the state-level identity-based signing into the Ethereum 
blockchain? 
• SQ4 How to create a wallet with multiple transaction approval steps? 
• SQ5 How to verify identity-based signatures in Ethereum blockchain? 
• SQ6 How to check that a transaction made in the past, was made with valid identity? 
This thesis consists of five chapters:  
Chapter 1 presents the topic, scope, problem and questions that the thesis will solve. 
Chapter 2 includes the review of the literature of the problem space in three sections:  
a. The Ethereum Blockchain is explored to gain an understanding of what its core 
mechanism is and where the solution would be integrated. 
b. The current solutions available for Ethereum wallet protection are reviewed and 
compared to understand what approaches are used in current solutions and what are 
the differences between them.  
c. The review of the state-level identity verification services available in Estonia. 
This chapter also presents the summary of the literature review and analyzes the possible 
application of the knowledge gained from the literature to the proposed solution. 
Chapter 3 explains the requirements and current state to create the specification for identity-
based wallet integration with Dapp. It is a more detailed analysis of the results and choices 
made in Chapter 2, with real examples.  
Chapter 4 presents the prototype of the solution to the problem outlined in this thesis. This 
chapter also validates the prototype against the specification. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the work, presents the solution and outcomes and provides 
concluding remarks. 
8 
 
2 Background and literature review 
This chapter covers the problem space and evaluates the working solutions that need to be 
taken into account in the development of the one solution presented later in this thesis. 
The problem space is Ethereum Dapp1, a blockchain based application that uses its own 
currency tokens2. These tokens are transferred from user to user and everything is written 
into the blockchain. Because the solution needs to integrate with blockchain, the Ethereum 
blockchain functionality is described in Section 2.1. A wallet is a part of the blockchain and 
hence also a part of the problem space. To answer SQ1 and SQ4 research questions, security 
solutions for wallets are reviewed and compared in section 2.2. Based on the requirement 
of using the Estonian national identity services, the available possibilities for integration 
were reviewed and compared in section 2.3 to support answers for SQ2, SQ3 and SQ5. 
 
2.1 Ethereum Blockchain 
Blockchain is a technology that is based on a digitally distributed ledger system that has no 
central storage owner authority. Unlike the traditional cloud storage approaches, the 
Ethereum blockchain technology is open, which means that all records are trustfully shared 
among parties. All users who run a certain blockchain software are called nodes. Nodes 
store individual copies of records of the entire blockchain system. As nodes can be located 
anywhere in the world, blockchain systems are globally decentralized. Because everything 
stored in nodes is public, the system is self-verifying being in a so-called state of consensus. 
In addition to storing, nodes carry out a verification process of new data validity against 
other nodes’ copies (also called the mining process). Such process enables the blockchain 
to be robust, which means that all the data stored in the network cannot be manipulated by 
a single node and has no single point of failure. Blockchain networks are transparent and 
incorruptible, which makes them safe to be called the single source of truth (RF Wireless 
World, 2012) (Blockgeeks, 2018) (Berryhill, Bourgery, & Hanson, 2018). 
Ethereum is an open source platform that runs on the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). 
EVM is a turing complete software that is working in the Ethereum network. An abstract 
layer of the network enables to create own rules of ownership, transaction formats, and state 
transition functions. These features are possible due to smart contracts, which are a set of 
rules that are executed only if certain conditions are met (Vujičić, Jagodić, & Ranđić, 2018). 
In addition, this solution enabled the possibility to create decentralized applications. 
Ethereum provides its own high-level programming language named Solidity. Solidity is 
one of the most common languages in blockchain solutions for writing smart contracts, 
which is very similar to JavaScript. Solidity enables engineers to develop registries of debts 
or promises, different markets or move assets according to some instructions as defined in 
the past (Grech & Camilleri, 2017) (Destefanis, Marchesi, & Ortu, 2018). 
  
 
1 Dapp – decentralized application of Ethereum platform. 
2 Token – Ethereum platform can issue tokens for Dapps. Tokens are smart contracts that implement standards 
of Ethereum. In majority of Dapps, the ERC20 Token Standard is used as the native currency (Vujičić, Jagodić, 
& Ranđić, 2018). 
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Blocks 
Blocks in Ethereum Blockchain contain a block number, difficulty, nonce3, transaction list 
and the most recent state. The blocks are containers of smaller fractions of data – the 
transactions. To enable data validation across the network each block has a hashed link to 
the previous block, as shown in Figure 2. The hashing process is a mathematical problem 
that must be mined by the computational power of a node in the network. The output of the 
hashing process obtained by the input values passed through a cryptographic algorithm 
results in a unique combination of numbers and letters with a fixed number of bits (Berryhill, 
Bourgery, & Hanson, 2018). The hashed links enable blockchain data to be immutable and 
consistent across the network. There is no way to remove data that has been written into the 
blockchain. Distributed network is about consistency across all of the participants in the 
blockchain network. Ethereum uses a proof-of-work validation scheme where all 
participants must agree on a common ledger and have access to all entries of blocks ever 
recorded (Valenta & Sandner, 2017).  
 
 
Figure 2. Blockchain block link visualization (Saurel, 2018) 
 
Transactions 
A blockchain transaction is the core information that is stored as data in the blocks. Creating 
a smart contract, broadcasting a smart contract and interacting with it is done by separate 
transactions. Basically, one type of interaction with a smart contract can be described as a 
banking transaction between persons A and B that is written in a hashed format. The 
transaction flow (Wei, 2017) of the Ethereum blockchain works as follows  
1. The person A is requesting a transaction to the person B.  
2. The transaction is digitally signed and broadcasted to the network for validation 
according to a logic, which is set by the creators of the Ethereum blockchain system. 
In a transaction, there can be one or many inputs and outputs.  
3. One node validates the broadcasted transaction and picks a block to include the 
processed transaction in. When the transaction is marked as valid and stored in the 
block it will wait until the prerequisites of a complete block are fulfilled.  
4. The fulfilled block is sealed with the hash as described before and distributed across 
the network to validate the new block with its hashed value.  
5. The block is published to the network once all the nodes are confirming the new 
block’s hash. 
 
 
3 Nonce – the number of transactions sent from a given address. 
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Transaction Costs 
Each transaction made on Ethereum blockchain costs a certain amount of so-called “Gas”. 
The sum of the Gas cost is calculated as sum of every operation performed in a transaction. 
Each block has a Gas limit, the amount of execution work that is needed to perform a 
transaction and pay for that execution process itself. Ethereum Virtual Machine spends a 
certain amount of Gas during the transaction execution according to specific rules 
(Ethereum, 2019). 
The Gas parameter has its own price, which is configurable by the transaction creator. The 
Gas limit is multiplied by the Gas price and paid upfront before the execution of the 
transaction. If some Gas is left after the execution, it will be refunded to the creator of the 
transaction. The Ethereum network has limits to the transaction processing speed based on 
the nodes’ availability. The less is paid for the Gas the longer it takes to perform a 
transaction. If more Gas is needed for the transaction than allocated, the process is fully 
reverted to the beginning state (Ethereum, 2019). 
 
Wallet 
Transactions in a blockchain can be made using specific assets, for example a numeric value 
in a Dapp currency, described in a blockchain system, it can be a digital currency, energy 
tokens or any value that can be transferred between the participants of the blockchain. In 
most of the blockchain systems the information on these assets is presented in a hashed 
form. To make transactions, there is a need to have a wallet, which includes these assets. A 
blockchain wallet is an asset account, that has two types of keys – public and private, both 
generated when the wallet is created (Andreas M. Antonopoulos, 2018). 
 
Public and private keys 
A public key is a public piece of information in a blockchain network, it is similar to a bank 
account number in a bank. Making transactions in a blockchain system can be described as 
sending assets from public key A to public key B. Public keys are created using 
cryptographical algorithms. Special properties in the mathematical functions used in these 
algorithms makes the creation of such keys simple, but also make it very hard to calculate 
their inverse (Berryhill, Bourgery, & Hanson, 2018).  
A private key is used to sign the transactions and is the only way to access the digital assets 
in the wallet. Although the blockchain system itself may be secure enough, the security of 
the private key has to be ensured by the users themselves (Andreas M. Antonopoulos, 2018). 
 
Smart Contracts 
When the basic implementation of a distributed ledger was introduced in Blockchain 1.0, 
cryptocurrency became the most common application of blockchains. The financial market 
was the simplest way to popularize blockchain systems. Large amounts of digital currencies 
were implemented for trading and investing. The next step was the implementation of the 
Ethereum Blockchain, in Blockchain 2.0, which introduced the smart contract concept 
(Berryhill, Bourgery, & Hanson, 2018) (Unibright.io, 2017). 
Smart contracts are a set of rules that can be executed when conditions are met, they are 
similar to the users of the blockchain network. These are pieces of written scripts that are 
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connected to the blockchain network. The main advantage of smart contracts is that these 
are nearly impossible to hack, because they are controlled by the blockchain logic, which 
reduces the costs of execution and verification and also protects from fraud or third-party 
interference (Berryhill, Bourgery, & Hanson, 2018). 
Because smart contracts can be written by anyone, it enables individuals and companies to 
write some of the business logic directly into the blockchain. The simplest example of a 
smart contract is user A sending assets to user B after, for example, 5 days. The smart 
contract definition describes a time-based condition, takes assets from A, holds them as a 
third-party user in the network and then allows to execute the transaction to B only when 5 
days have passed. Smart contracts enable to create decentralized autonomous organizations 
in the blockchain systems (Christidis, 2016) (Berryhill, Bourgery, & Hanson, 2018). 
In more detail, the smart contract can be separated into four independent parts: contractual 
arrangements, control of preconditions, execution and finalization (Figure 3). In the 
contractual arrangements (also called “create” activity), the parties who are involved decide 
on their liabilities and write these into the code. As an output, there is an executable form 
stored in the blockchain system. In the preconditions phase (known as “freeze” activity), 
every node in the blockchain system can assess the smart contract to check the conditions, 
so that the written logic is stored on the blockchain. This is the governance part of a smart 
contract as it is checked publicly on the blockchain. It is followed by the execution part, 
which evaluates the transactions that were defined to be executed in case the conditions are 
met (Christian Sillaber, 2017). 
 
 
Figure 3 The life cycle of a smart contract: phases, actors and services (Murthy, 2017). 
 
 
2.2 Wallet protection solutions 
The literature review has produced a feature overview of existing solutions, that were found 
in the reviewed sources. The features are listed in Table 1. The main purpose is to analyze 
the different solutions available for protecting blockchain users’ asset wallets and their 
connection to the users themselves. To get a better overview, solutions made for different 
Blockchains have been covered. There are many technologies and methods to protect the 
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user’s wallet, each of these having specific pros and cons. Most blockchain systems are 
using similar solutions, but Ethereum for example, has additional solutions due to smart 
contracts (Cheetah Mobile Blockchain Research Lab & Cheetah Lab, 2018). 
Table 1 compares five different solutions that are being used for wallet private key storage 
and/or for security enhancement. For the purposes of answering SQ1, two possible types of 
wallet security were discovered – hardware-based and software-based. As wallet security is 
a part of the blockchain process that requires user interactions, it leads directly to SQ2. The 
aim is to find a solution that requires a smaller number of human actions, a possibility to 
connect the user with his identity and allow the introduction of an additional approval step 
before transferring assets.  
Table 1 Comparison of wallet protection solutions 
Name Type 
Protectio
n 
Connectivit
y 
technology 
Connect
s to  
Approva
l 
possibilit
y 
User 
identit
y 
Backup 
possibilit
y 
BlueWallet Hardwar
e 
PIN Bluetooth  Mobile; 
computer 
no no unknown 
Ledger Hardwar
e 
PIN 
4-8 length 
USB Compute
r 
no no yes 
Multisignatur
e 
Smart-
contract 
Relies to 
code and 
contract 
owner 
wallet 
security 
Blockchain 
network 
Depends 
on last 
security 
method 
applied 
yes no yes 
MetaMask 
Wallet 
Browser
-
extensio
n 
User 
password. 
12-word  
recovery  
Internet, 
browser-
plugin 
Compute
r 
no no yes 
Coinbase Web-
Service 
Username
, 
password, 
2-step 
Auth 
Internet Anywher
e on the 
web 
no no yes 
The following sections explain the wallet protection solutions from Table 1 in more detail. 
 
2.2.1 Ledger 
A ledger is a hardware wallet created specifically for protecting blockchain private keys. It 
stores the private key entirely on hardware and provides access to it when a PIN-code is 
entered. The initial setup of ledgers includes a recovery code generation to allow the private 
key recovery in case of device damage or other issues. To allow for the recovery, it is 
necessary to securely save the number of words that are needed to be entered in case of 
restoring the key. The device can store 25 different blockchain private keys at the same time 
(Ledger, 2018) (Bruno, 2017). 
The Ledger solution is one of the simplest and the most popular one. The risk remains in the 
software failure of the ledger device or in its physical damage. There are also usability issues 
associated with the need of using a computer and a connecting wire each time a transaction 
is made. 
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2.2.2 BlueWallet 
A BlueWallet is a hardware solution that is implemented to securely authorize blockchain 
transactions. It is mainly focused on Bitcoin blockchain transaction verification. The 
BlueWallet represents a proof of concept of secure communication between hardware and 
blockchain networks using a Bluetooth Low Energy connected device. In addition, this 
solution can be used as an alternative payment method instead of using cash or credit cards 
(Bamert T., 2014). 
This concept requires that transactions that are made in a Bitcoin Blockchain can be 
prepared offline from the blockchain network. This allows the solution to be completely 
separated from any network. The transaction should be confirmed by the user’s private key, 
which is safely stored in the hardware itself and protected with a PIN code. In case a bitcoin 
transaction is made using a computer, it allows to sign the transaction using a Bluetooth 
connected BlueWallet hardware for enhanced transaction security (Bamert T., 2014). 
This approach uses quite a simple solution for storing a private key on hardware, but in 
addition, it provides a convenient mechanism to sign transactions wirelessly, while 
traditional hardware solutions are wired. The main risk of theft is reduced, since the user is 
disconnected from the internet, although hardware errors or physical problems are still 
possible. The access to the private key is simplified to having only a PIN code, which 
increases the risk in case the device is stolen. 
 
2.2.3 Multisignature 
The Multisignature wallet also referred to as “multi-sig” is a different approach to solving 
the private key security issue. Multisignature allows to create multiple private keys that need 
to be used for signing a transaction. In this approach, multiple users have independent 
private keys, which are applied as authorization signatures in a Multisignature wallet. This 
solution requires more than one individual to use his key to make a transaction from the 
wallet. For example, if you are having a multi-sig wallet in a three-person family, then if 
something happens with one of the family members the wallet can be accessed by two others 
(Hannan, 2018) (Unchained Capital, 2018). 
The control remains in the user’s hands, so although it is better to have multiple sources and 
possibilities, this solution is still subject to human error. However, with this solution the 
recovery of a stolen key is possible. Technically, to make Multisignature work, it is required 
to have smart contracts in the blockchain. Each transaction that will be made using a 
Multisignature wallet should be executed within the framework of specific smart contract(s). 
It adds complexity to the system and may cause vulnerability in case of an incorrect 
implementation. This means that for each transaction there is a need for multiple users and 
this solution may not be as user-friendly as the ones that rely on a single user (Hannan, 2018) 
(Unchained Capital, 2018). 
 
2.2.4 MetaMask 
MetaMask is a web browser extension wallet that works for Ethereum blockchain. It is an 
open source project that creates connections between Chrome, Firefox and Brave browsers 
and Ethereum blockchain. This solution uses Hierarchical deterministic settings by giving 
the user a list of words that can be used to reset lost account information. MetaMask allows 
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users to store their private and public keys in their own browser’s local storage. This solution 
is not securing the keys completely, because while it is reasonably safe to store your own 
keys in the browser application, it also has a connection to the internet, which presents other 
security issues. While the browser is connected to the internet, there is a risk of facing 
phishing attacks using browser’s opened tabs and stealing information through fake forms 
or pop-ups opened from websites (King, 2018). 
MetaMask improves the usability of private key in terms of ease of transactions, but it makes 
the user’s computer and its browser susceptible to malicious actions that can be made 
through the Internet. The list of words for restoring access to the keys needs to be stored in 
some place physically or electronically, which is nearly the same level of risk as storing the 
private key itself.  
 
2.2.5 Coinbase Wallet 
Coinbase is a web-based digital currency market that offers its own wallet storage. The 
user’s wallet keys data is stored using AES-256 encryption on Coinbase servers. The servers 
are entirely disconnected from the Internet for extra security. A secret sharing method is 
used to split the data and backup on USB drives and papers, which are geographically 
distributed around the world. For a user, there is both a username and password protection 
as well as a 2-step verification available. Coinbase fully manages the private key of the 
user’s wallet, so the user cannot use or even see the key separately (Coinbase, 2019). The 
service is widely used, which means that this web-service wallet solution is trustworthy and 
widely accepted by the users. Coinbase has more than 25 million users by today (Wilma 
Woo, 2018). 
The usability is quite good, due to the private key management by Coinbase. There is an 
application available to interact with the wallet. The risk is mostly on the service-side to 
securely hold and use the private key. User only stands for his account password and 2-step 
verification process, which is quite simple and recoverable. This solution does not provide 
identity verification. 
 
2.2.6 Comparison 
Ledger is a solution that does not connect to internet, so we cannot access and verify user’s 
identity online. This is needed for our solution, because identity related services have 
certificates that need to be checked for validity.  It has a closed hardware, that cannot be 
modified and integrated with identity. Interaction needs a computer, which means solution 
usage on mobile device is not possible. BlueWallet is nearly the same, except that it is 
wireless. 
MetaMask is connected to computers browser and has no connection to user identity that is 
also needed for our solution. Additional approving step is not allowed. 
Coinbase web-service Wallet solution is a good example to use for implementing own 
solution, because it has a large number of users that supports, and trust in Coinbase web-
service. In that field number of users means that service is trustful and well working. The 
wallet can be accessed using internet from any device, but there is no possibility to develop 
own integrations, so identity solutions cannot be connected. 
Multisignature allows to use example script that is deployed to the blockchain network for 
usage. As it is open-sourced it can be taken in to account as a template to make own 
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modifications. Cons of Multisignature is that it is fully self-written and it can be not well 
tested or secured against issues. Multisignature is not device related, because it is in the 
Blockchain network. Multisignature wallet can be controlled using Dapp. 
 
2.3 User identity verification and signature services 
This section briefly describes three possible ways of electronic identity (eID) verifying at 
state level in Estonia. The aim of this section is to point out the specifications that will help 
answer questions SQ2 and SQ3. All of the services use certificates issued by SK ID 
Solutions AS which also provides validity confirmation and time-stamping services. First 
solution is based on national ID-card, second and third are mobile services. An overview of 
the solutions and comparison of the features and prices are compared  (SK ID Solutions AS, 
2019). 
Table 2 gives an overview of the three Estonian nation-level identity services and their 
differences. The important point was the operational complexity, from the user’s 
perspective, of any action that requires confirmation of identity. Number of users is showed 
to get overview of potential use of the service. Prices are taken into account to see 
approximate cost of solution and additional charge for user. 
Table 2 Table concluding different Identity Services 
Service ID-card based Mobile-ID based Smart-ID based 
Price for user 
25€ citizen 
Adult or 100€ for  
1€/month 0 
Number of steps 
for authentication 
4 3 3 
Equipment needed 
for use 
ID-card, computer, 
Internet, 
card reader 
Mobile phone, mobile 
phone network connection 
Smartphone 
(Android/iOS), any kind 
of internet connection 
Number of access 
points per identity 
1 1 
More than one (limit not 
specified) 
Number of users in 
Estonia 
~1198876 
(Estonia, 2019)  
~193000 
(Sibold, 2018) 
~341803 (Lõugas, 2018) 
Number of users in 
total 
~1198876 
(Estonia, 2019)  
~400000 
(SK ID Solutions AS, 
2019) 
~2001187 
(Smart-ID, 2019) 
Integration layer 
SOAP API 
DigiDocService 
SOAP API DigiDocService Smart-ID REST API 
 
 
2.3.1 ID-card based solution 
ID-card is a mandatory identity document in Estonia which is connected to one person’s 
physical identity. It is a secure data carrier for keys and certificates to verify user’s identity. 
The card itself can be used for many operations, e.g. as a national ID document, national 
health insurance card, proof of identification for bank accounts, i-Voting, for digital 
signature creation and to access many other e-services (Republic of Estonia Information 
System Authority, 2019; e-estonia, 2019). 
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ID-card has a chip which is used to read certificates from the card. The public key 
infrastructure (PKI) model uses secret and public keys which are stored separately. The 
connection of the keys is used to prove person’s identity for e-services or to make a digital 
signature. The secret key is protected and can only be used by its original owner and the 
public key is available to everyone. All of the operations that can be performed using an ID-
card are PIN-protected to prevent misuse of the card (Republic of Estonia Information 
System Authority, 2019). 
To use this service there is a need for the government issued card itself, which can be issued 
to Estonian citizens or e-Residents (Politsei- ja Piirivalveamet, 2019). In addition to the card 
itself there are also issued PINs which are needed to perform any operation with using the 
card.  
Each card has certificates stored inside that are needed to be valid and up to date to perform 
any digital actions. Certificates are validated every time they are used for authentication or 
document signing procedure against Certificate Authority service. This validation service 
should be used by e-service provider (SK ID Solutions AS, 2018). 
Computer with an internet connection, card reader and ID-card software are needed as 
additional equipment to use the card-based services (id.ee, 2019). The process of 
authentication for e-service includes 4 steps: 
• Connecting to computer using a card reader 
• Entering e-service 
• Requesting authentication using an ID-card 
• Entering the card’s PIN code 
 
2.3.2 Mobile-ID based solution 
Mobile devices are the most used personal devices in these days and mobile based electronic 
identity services are becoming widely used around European Union. Mobile-ID service is 
an addition to Estonian ID-card based solution, which uses special SIM card to perform eID 
authentication and signature creation. The service has to be ordered from the mobile network 
operator and costs 1€ per month (Kubach, 2015).  
Issuing Mobile-ID SIM card follows the same requirements as an ID-card. The user’s 
private keys are stored on the SIM card’s chip and are only accessible with valid PIN codes 
that are provided by the issuer. SIM card has a small application that is used to deliver 
authentication and signature processes through the mobile network. All data exchanges over 
the service are performed over an encrypted connection (e-estonia, 2019).  
To integrate an e-service with Mobile-ID there is a need to use DigiDocService which 
provides SOAP-based web integration layer. To use this service, you need to have any kind 
of mobile phone and mobile network connection. The process of authentication for e-service 
requires 3 steps: 
• Entering an e-service 
• Requesting authentication using Mobile-ID 
• Entering a PIN code on the phone 
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2.3.3 SplitKey based Smart-ID 
SplitKey is an Authentication and Digital Signature Platform which uses end-user mobile 
devices (iOS and Android) to allow secure authentications. The solution can be used as an 
end-user access management tool for various e-services. SplitKey is fast and scalable 
solution that is secure based on threshold cryptosystem. The solution allows digitally 
signing documents according to the eIDAS directive of the European Union Regulation 
(Cybernetica AS, 2017). 
The technology is a mixed token solution which combines the benefits of using a 
cryptographic hardware token and a software token. The main concept is to separate the 
private key into two parts and store them in separated systems. The concept consists of three 
main components. The first system is in the client mobile device and it is used for 
authentication and digital signing. The second one is the service provider on the server (also 
referred to as portal), which allows account management, user registration and customer 
support. The third is the core servers and HSM4’s. The important role of this server is to 
provide secure control of the client’s private key. The server-side provides trust, auditability 
and assurance that a mobile device is not able to achieve independently. The client is the 
sole possessor of the full final key. Full final key can be used only by entering a PIN code 
from the device. Legally, the keys do not exist in isolation, they can exist only with client’s 
personal identity certificates. There is a need to bind user’s identity to onboard the newly 
created public key and results of SplitKey private keys  (Cybernetica AS, 2018). 
Smart-ID is main product that is powered by SplitKey technology. It is mostly used in 
Estonia and the Baltic states. The authentication and signature are recognized as highest 
level Qualified Electronic Signature in EU. In combination with recognition as QSCD 
(Qualified Signature Creation Device) Smart-ID is allowed to create signatures on the same 
level as ID-card or Mobile-ID based solutions. Smart-ID uses international scheme that is 
meant to be used across countries with different eID implementations. The solution already 
offers Smart-ID for identity providers, which means potential growth of the solution (SK ID 
Solutions AS, 2019). 
To use this service, the user needs to have a smartphone with iOS or Android operating 
system and any kind of network connection. The process of authentication for e-service 
consists of 3 steps: 
• Entering an e-service 
• Requesting authentication using Smart-ID 
• Entering a PIN code on the phone 
 
2.3.4 Comparison 
ID-card based solution needs the most steps to perform any action, because of the additional 
hardware it uses. Mobile-ID and Smart-ID solutions have the same number of steps. The 
difference between them lies in how the service is accessed and the type of network 
connection required. Mobile-ID is strongly mobile operator related and requires additional 
monthly fee to use it. The advantage of Mobile-ID from the usability perspective is only 
that it can be used by any mobile phone. The advantage of Smart-ID is that it can be used 
 
4 HSM - Hardware Security Module 
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on any iOS and Android device connected to any type of internet and it has no fees for the 
end user. 
Integration for all of the services can be done using web service API. For ID-card and 
Mobile-ID solutions there are SOAP web services and Smart-ID uses a REST API. ID-card 
and Mobile-ID services are stricter to Estonian national eID PKI and are harder to 
implement in other countries, where Smart-ID has an advantage. Smart-ID offers an Identity 
Provider package for new eID providers which helps to expand the service usage.  
 
2.4 Summary 
The overview of wallet security solutions shows that none of them connects to user’s 
identity which is needed for our solution. Having connection between identity of person and 
his actions will enable to protect participants’ rights. This is one of the reasons why we start 
analyzing how to make it possible in our work. To support SQ4 Multisignature will be taken 
into account for further analysis in section 3.3.2. Multisignature allows to create own 
solution that can be integrated with any Ethereum Blockchain Dapp. Multisignature is code- 
based solution that does not require additional equipment to work. It will be an open-sourced 
code, that will make it possible to get feedback from users to improve the solution in the 
future.  
In addition, we can state that Smart-ID is most accessible for user from other reviewed 
identity solutions. Smart-ID does not require additional equipment, only users mobile 
phone. It also does not have additional fees for end user and any internet connection can be 
used to access the service. The solution has an additional advantage because of REST API 
and possibility to integrate new identity providers. Smart-ID will be reviewed in more detail 
in section 3.3.3.  
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3 Specification of identity-based wallet integration with Dapp. 
The creation of specification will consider explanation of the entities that will be used. Then 
in first part we will show what are the main requirements that we need to fulfill to solve the 
problem. We will use BPMN language to explain how current solutions, hereafter called 
AS-IS processes, work. These processes will be explained to see that current state is not 
fulfilling the requirements. In the second part we will extract information from existing 
solutions and analyze them. Analysis outcome will be used in solution specification, 
hereafter TO-BE process. The third part is modelling TO-BE process specification and its 
mappings to the requirements. BPMN models are including only information that is needed 
for scope of the specification. 
The main entities of the model context are: 
• Approver – the user who have rights to accept and sign transaction request; 
• Asset – value stored in wallet;  
• Authentication – process which confirms that user is exactly the person whom he 
calls himself; 
• Dapp – web-based application that is connected to blockchain, which is used interact 
with smart contracts deployed in blockchain network and services available in the 
internet; 
• Identity – user’s state issued national identity; 
• Smart Contract – program script code which is part of the system that runs on 
blockchain; 
• Signature – value that is cryptographically signed using user personal private key; 
• System – Combination of software in context; 
• Transaction – identifier of asset transfer;  
• User – person who has account on application or potentially creates one; 
• User account – entry in application that stores user’s information and allows user to 
use application; 
• Wallet – Ethereum blockchain account with private and public keys. 
 
3.1 Requirements 
This section lists the requirements for the solution that are outlined by WePower Network5 
and refactored to fit the scope of this thesis. Functional requirements are listed in Table 3 
and non-functional requirements for identity service are showed in  
Table 4. 
  
 
5 WePower Network - https://wepower.network/ 
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Table 3 Functional requirements 
ID Requirement 
R1 User should sign up to the Dapp only with identity authentication. 
R2 User should have an asset wallet that is connected with identity. 
R3 
User should transfer assets to another user only after signing transaction with identity 
signature. 
R4 Approver should approve assets transfer. 
R5 Approver should approve transfer by signing transaction with an identity signature. 
 
Table 4 Non-functional requirements 
ID Non-Functional Requirement 
NFR1 Identity service should not require additional fees from the user. 
NFR2 Actions with identity service should not require additional pluggable equipment. 
 
3.2 AS-IS processes specification 
This section describes AS-IS process models that are related to the requirements. Aim is to 
get overview of the processes and target tasks that should be updated with required 
functionality. 
Figure 4 shows main tasks that are followed to sign up to application. The process includes 
two participants user and application. Model shows that blockchain wallet is created 
separately of the application and wallet protection solution (one of mentioned in chapter 
2.2) is used to protect the wallet private key. User signs up to application and uses wallet 
address to link his account to the wallet.  
 
 
Figure 4 AS-IS sign up 
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Figure 5 describes process of making transaction. The model shows that after user have 
successfully logged in, the initiation of transaction should be triggered and after that 
application prepares the transaction and asks private key. Private key is accessed by user 
using one of wallet protection solutions (mentioned in chapter 2.2) and provided to 
application to perform transaction.  
 
 
Figure 5 AS-IS make transaction 
 
On the models we can see that user is not connecting his identity to the application. The 
transaction model shows that there is no approval step and transaction is not connected to 
users identity signature. Overview of AS-IS processes relation to requirements are 
concluded in Table 5. This table shows that none of the requirements are fulfilled in AS-IS 
sign up and transaction process.   
 
Table 5. AS-IS processes relation to requirements. Requirement not fulfilled is indicated as " - " and not 
related marked as empty cell. 
Process R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 NFR1 NFR2 
Sign up - -      
Make transaction   - - -   
 
3.3 Analysis of existing solutions 
To create TO-BE specification for the solution there will be three different aspects analyzed. 
The first part shows existing example of identity-based signing in smart contract. Analysis 
of Multisignature examples is explained in the section 3.3.2 and processes of Smart-ID in 
the third section 3.3.3. 
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3.3.1 Identity service integration with smart contract - Ethstonia example 
This chapter analyzes how Ethstonia solution works. Ethstonia was a prototype which is 
connecting government issued ID-card to Ethereum blockchain wallet and allow to sign 
transactions using this ID. It is in prototype stage, so there was no interface online. The 
solution is web page application, which connects to the Ethereum blockchain. Application 
needs to be run from source code, and it needs ID- card from Estonia to apply the transaction. 
There were no specification how the wallet itself was created and where the actual keys of 
Ethereum wallet were stored (Logvinov, Ethstonia Identity, 2018). 
To investigate the solution source code (Logvinov, 2019), the prototype was reviewed and 
executed. The outcome of the review is visualized using BPMN model. Figure 6 shows the 
main process flow of making transaction with three actors – user, application (Dapp) and 
Smart contract. Tasks explain the flow of transaction process and data object usages. This 
solution creates signature on hashed object that contains receiver wallet address and value 
to be transferred. The same object and its signed values are sent to smart contract to perform 
signature verification. After successful signature verification transaction is sent to receiver 
with specified value. 
 
 
Figure 6 Ethstonia transaction process 
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This solution is created using Truffle framework and the same framework that provides local 
network is used for execution. Execution of this solution is limited and cannot be fully 
performed due to costs of the computational tasks and signature verification task. The Gas 
values used in transactions of the solution exceeds Gas limit values that are currently used 
in live network, which is ~8M of Gas per block (Etherscan, 2019). 
Outputs of Ethstonia example analysis is listed in Table 6. Ethstonia example shows that 
signature must be verified and verification process is too expensive process in blockchain 
network.  As conclusion we see that it is important to have sufficient data to be signed with 
identity signature and the calculations should be optimized to be cost efficient. 
 
 
Table 6 Extracted information from Ethstonia example. 
Specification topic Extracted information 
Data to be signed with 
identity 
There should be necessary data to be signed. In case of Ethstonia 
there is only receiver and value, which is not enough to associate 
specific transaction with user’s signature. 
Hashing algorithm Ethereum calculates hashes with SHA3/keccak256. 
Signature verification Every signature created with the identity should be verified before 
executing the transaction. 
Calculations costs Calculations for signature verification might require more Gas than 
can be used in the network. Calculations performed in the smart 
contract should be simple to be executable on the chain 
Solidity Framework Truffle Framework to write smart contracts and Dapp 
 
3.3.2 Multisignature wallet contracts 
This section describes results of the analysis of three different Multisignature smart contract 
solutions. The main feature of Multisignature contract is make blockchain transactions by 
acceptance of multiple users. This is exactly what is needed to fulfill requirement R4 where 
one user will be who wants to perform transaction and another one who approves it. Purpose 
of this analysis is extracting knowhows and finding suitable examples for solution to be 
implemented.  
According to overview of Multisignature contracts (Unchained Capital, 2018), there are 
some contracts that lost their trust due to code vulnerability issues. ConsenSys, Gnosis and 
BitGo Multisignature Wallet contracts are still trustful and used in production. Trust of the 
Multisignature contract is important and implementing a solution from scratch is not 
reasonable. Source codes of contracts are reviewed to find reusable features of existing 
contracts. The output of the reviews is additional input for decisions made for solution’s 
TO-BE specification. 
ConsenSys Multisignature Wallet (George, 2017) and Gnosis Multisignature Wallet 
(George, 2019) source codes are from the same author and the functionality of the contracts 
are nearly the same. Common features and specifics of the contracts are as follows: 
• Constructor defines an array of owners’ addresses and a number of required 
confirmations for asset transaction (up to 50). 
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• Allows to add, delete, replace owner addresses. Method should be executed by the 
wallet address itself. 
• Allows to change required number of confirmations by walled address. 
• Separated methods for transaction submission and confirmation. 
• Submitted transaction is stored as a struct that holds all the required data to execute 
the asset transfer when needed. 
• No transaction signatures used, submitted transaction gets its id that other owners 
should confirm. 
• Owners can revoke their confirmation. 
• Transaction can be executed by anyone, if required number of confirmations 
condition are filled. 
In addition to common features, ConsenSys contract has daily withdraw limit and Gnosis 
has additional features to call current state of the transactions and confirmations. 
BitGo Multisignature Wallet v2 (Allmendinger, Chan, & barathcj, 2017) source code is 
reviewed, and main features and specifics are extracted: 
• Constructor defines exactly 3 owners’ addresses. 
• Uses modifier (requirement check) for all public methods. 
• Uses sequence in each transaction to prevent replay attacks and verify if the same 
sequence transaction has not been called before. 
• Transfer assets requires signature argument, which is created using keccak256 with 
arguments prefix, receiver address, value, data, expire time. 
• Uses one method to perform asset transaction to new address, first owner is taken 
as sender address and second from signature of one of the other participants (two 
participants of three in total). 
• During transaction method execution operation hash is created to retrieve second 
participant from signature hash. 
• Uses additional feature called safe mode to prevent asset transferring to wrong 
addresses. 
Main difference of these contracts is that how many methods should be called before the 
execution, due to that BitGo contract needs to create its own signature that is verified before 
the transfer. Outcome of the review has a number of features that are listed in Table 7. 
According to requirements R3, R4, R5 there is a need to have multiple steps before 
execution, because first user needs to initiate the transaction and this transaction should exist 
before approval. In that case solution should use combination of reviewed contracts. To 
conclude the table, we can say that most of the basic methods and features will be reused in 
solution implementation. 
 
Table 7 Extracted information from Multisignature wallet analysis. 
Source Specification topic Extracted information 
Gnosis, ConsenSys Transaction 
Create transaction struct to store all 
transactions and make them accessible by 
id. 
Use boolean “executed” for transaction 
state tracking. 
Use different methods for transaction 
initiation and confirming. 
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BitGo Hashing algorithm 
Keccak256 (Sha3) algorithm used to hash 
used information in smart contract. 
Gnosis, ConsenSys, BitGo Modifier 
Modifier used to check conditions before 
method execution in smart contract. 
Gnosis, ConsenSys, BitGo Address 
Store addresses of contract owners during 
contract creation. 
 
3.3.3 Smart-ID signing and authentication process 
The section describes the process of Smart-ID based authentication and signing. Main 
entities, execution steps and specifications are extracted and summarized. Output shows 
specifications identity related functionality needed to fulfill the requirements. 
Entities of Smart-ID process are as follows: 
• Relying Party (RP) – The service that initiates Smart-ID processes, in case of this 
project the Dapp. 
• Certificate – certificate that belongs to certificate authority, which Public Key values 
(exponent and modulus) are needed to verify signature.  
• Data – hashed value of the document to be signed or random generated value in case 
of authentication 
• Certificate Authority (CA) – Authority that holds certificate of the person’s identity 
• Verification code – The code that shows up on RP and mobile device which indicates 
that signing or authentication is performed on the same data on both sides. 
• Signature – object of value and algorithm that is result of signing or authentication 
process. It can be used to verify the validity of signed data. 
• Mobile device – device receives authentication or signing requests. Device where 
user confirms actions by entering a PIN code. 
• Smart-ID backend – application of Smart-ID system that interacts with RP, Mobile 
device and CA. 
• Person’s identifier – identifier of person’s identity (example in Estonia 
38012121212) 
 
Smart-ID uses REST API based interface which allows the execution of signing and 
authentication processes. As our solution needs to integrate with Smart-ID we will show 
more detailed process visualization. Figure 7 is a sequence diagram that describes detailed 
authentication and signing process. The flow starts with request from Relying Party with 
person’s identifier and random data hash, and which receives the session id. Smart ID 
backend performs request from CA and starts user authentication on a mobile device. 
Relying party is polling for response of session until user confirmation on mobile device. 
Once user confirms authentication end result is returned (Jalukse, 2019). 
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Signing process consists of same steps as the authentication process, except that it has no 
interaction with CA. Second difference is that the data object of first POST request includes 
document hash that signature is requested for.  
The OSCP6 service can be used separately for checking certificate validity after the signature 
is made. This is the feature that supports SQ6, as we can always validate user’s identity to 
have a proof of valid signature. 
 
 
Figure 7 Smart-ID authentication and signing process sequence diagram (Nõmmik, 2017) 
Conclusion of Smart-ID analysis is shown in Table 8. For authentication or signing with 
Smart-ID the data should be hashed using SHA-2 type algorithm. Verification of signature 
is performed using RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 standard (Internet Engineering Task Force, 
(IETF), 2016), which is a mathematical calculation with 768-byte sized number. Execution 
of sample authentication and signing requests gives different certificate results. It means 
that signature cannot be verified with authentication certificate. As authentication and 
signing is in theory the same process, signing request can be used as authentication. To 
verify that user receives correct request of authentication or signing, verification code 
calculation is performed using data hash and output consisting of 4 digits is displayed on 
the mobile device and the service.  Hashing algorithm, signature verification and the steps 
through Smart-ID flow will be used in implementation of solution prototype. 
 
 
6 OSCP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) – service of the warranty of user certificate validity. 
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Table 8 Extracted specification from Smart-ID 
Specification topic Extracted information 
Hashing algorithm Supports only SHA-2 types of data hashing. 
Signature Verification standard RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5. 
Certificate Signature certificate should be stored for verification. 
Signing and authentication process 
Requires two requests to get data (initiation and getting 
session result). 
Verification code 
Is calculated as: 
integer(SHA256(data_hash)[−2:−1]) mod 10000 
 
3.4 TO-BE processes specification 
This section proposes TO-BE process models that fulfill the requirements. AS-IS processes 
are used as a starting point and specifications extracted from analyzes discussed in section 
3.3 are applied. All processes are modelled as success flow of the solution. As success flow 
we consider going through the user interaction process without any errors. 
AS-IS sign up process is creating connection between user and Dapp using only wallet 
address. The TO-BE model aim is to connect specific user wallet which is connected to user 
identity-based signature certificate provided by Smart-ID service. 
Figure 8 describes the sign up process to Dapp. Smart-ID is showed as part of the process 
to describe how R1 is fulfilled. Dapp requests user authentication and received certificate is 
passed to the new smart contract along with approver certificate, approver address, user 
personal id and wallet address. The new smart contract is instance of a new Identity-Based 
Multisignature Wallet, hereafter called IBMSW in this paper. User wallet address is used to 
interact with their IBMSW. Process results with new IBMSW deployed to blockchain 
network and new account is created in Dapp, which fulfills requirement R2.  
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Figure 8 TO-BE sign up to Dapp 
 
As user will have personal IBMSW after TO-BE signup process the AS-IS transaction 
process is extended with interactions between the contract and the Smart-ID service. 
Figure 9 describes transaction process using IBMSW. We are not mentioning the private 
key usage from Blockchain Wallet Protection Solution in the following models to be clearer 
on the interaction between Smart-ID, User, Dapp and Smart contract. We mention that the 
private key is used for every interaction with Smart Contract.  
A transaction process can be initiated only by user of Dapp. After user initiates and enters 
receiver address and value, a new record of transaction is created in IBMSW. Next step is 
to sign the transaction object that is created during the initiation. Signing process is 
performed with the hashed value of the transaction object. After signing is confirmed by the 
user, the signature is verified in IBMSW and added to transaction record. This step fulfills 
requirement R3, as it cannot be skipped. Next task is subprocess of transaction request 
approval, described in Figure 10. It is same the signing and verifying process as it is for the 
user, except that signing is performed by approver. By completing approval process, 
approver signature is added to transaction record. This shows that requirement R4 and R5 
are fulfilled, as transaction process cannot go further without this step. Last step of 
transaction is execution by the user, where confirmations are checked and value is 
transferred to the receiver. 
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Figure 9 TO-BE make transaction 
 
 
Figure 10 Transaction approval subprocess 
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Overview of requirements and relation with TO-BE processes is concluded in Table 9. Non-
functional requirements are marked fulfilled as Smart-ID uses smartphone application for 
authentication and signing and Smart-ID is free of charge for end user. 
 
Table 9 TO-BE processes relation to requirements. Requirement fulfilled is indicated as " + " and not 
related marked as empty cell. 
Process R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 NFR1 NFR2 
Sign up + +    + + 
Make transaction 
(with approval 
subprocess) 
  + + + + + 
 
In summary the main concept of TO-BE models is to integrate identity based Multisignature 
wallet into the Ethereum Dapp, also named as IBMSW. The Blockchain Wallet Protection 
solution that holds Ethereum wallet private key, will still remain to be free of choice for the 
user. Multisignature will only be additional layer in the process. This layer is connecting 
users’ identity to blockchain to enable signing the transaction with the identity signature 
through the Smart-ID. This enables us to fulfill all of the requirements raised in section 3.1.  
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4 Validating specification with prototype 
This chapter describes the implementation of the prototype that validates TO-BE process 
models discussed in section 0. Output of the existing solutions analysis from section 3.3 will 
be used as inputs. Prototype includes smart contract and Dapp implementation. 
 
4.1 Main frameworks and architecture 
Truffle framework has been chosen for smart contract implementation and testing in local 
Ethereum blockchain network. Truffle is using Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). 
Framework provides support for writing, debugging, migrating and deploying contracts 
written in solidity. Truffle has development boilerplates that helps to start implementing 
exactly what is needed without setup configuration.  
Dapp is created using JavaScript ReactJS framework. This framework is one of the most 
popular user interface frameworks in JavaScript. It has largest recommendations percent 
according to 2018 reports (Greif, Benitte, & Rambeau, 2018). Connection to Ethereum 
network from ReactJS was provided using web3.js library (Ethereum, 2019). Smart-ID 
integration was implemented using HTTP REST API requests to Smart-ID demo instance 
(SK-EID, 2019). 
General software architecture of the prototype is presented in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11 Architecture of prototype software 
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4.2 Validation example 
The prototype consists of two parts: the Dapp and the smart contract. The main logic is 
written in smart contract part and Dapp is used for interaction between Smart-ID and smart 
contract. 
 
To validate TO-BE specification we will go through sign up, transaction and transaction 
approval processes using prototype. 
 
To sign up user needs to provide their certificate that is given by Smart-ID service. First step 
is to enter user identity code in Dapp and signing a document. For prototype we used secure 
random generated hash (generated the same way as Smart-ID does authentication hash). 
After user signs the hash on their smartphone Dapp receives user’s certificate. With user 
certificate provided we use Dapp to create an instance of smart contract in Ethereum 
network. The user certificate is stored as owner certificate, that will be used to verify further 
signatures. In addition to user’s we save approver’s certificate. Which should be securely 
provided from Dapp in the real case, but to simplify our prototype, we use the same user’s 
certificate from another device. During this process we created new wallet that is connected 
to user’s identity with respect to requirements R1, R2, NFR1 and NFR2.  
 
To make a transaction user first needs to create a request in their wallet contract with amount 
and receiver address specified. Each request creates new record in smart contract. The data 
of transaction request is hashed and passed to Smart-ID service for signing. User signs 
hashed data using their smartphone and signed data is validated in smart contract using 
user’s certificate. The signature is stored in request record. The next step is to sign the data 
by approver, which certificate was written to the smart contract on creation. Approver signs 
the data same way using Smart-ID service. Their signature is validated using approver’s 
certificate and stored in request record. Transaction can be executed when both validated 
signatures are stored in transaction request record. Execution results with asset transaction 
to specified receiver address and amount. This process fulfills requirements R3, R4, R5, 
NFR1 and NFR2.  
 
As addition, the request record is accessible by its id to check its status. There can be 
multiple request created in parallel and executed in different order. This process works 
successfully following the TO-BE specification. 
 
 
4.3 Prototype project structure 
The prototype is an open-source project, which structure will be described in this section.  
A Truffle project is used as root which contains main truffle folders - contracts, migrations, 
test and truffle-config.js as shown in Figure 12 on the left. Solidity code is stored in contracts 
folder. Migration scripts specify Solidity contracts that will be deployed to network during 
truffle migration. Truffle network configuration and compilation output folder is configured 
in truffle-config.js. Compilation output is set directly to dapp/src/contracts folder, because 
Dapp is using compiled version of contracts. 
Dapp is created under truffle project in folder dapp shown in Figure 12 on the right. Dapp.js 
is main application script that combines all libraries, utilities and defines user interface. 
Scripts that helps to perform communication with Smart-ID (smartIdUtil.js), parse 
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certificates and signatures (cryptoUtil.js) and create connection to Ethereum network 
(getWeb3.js) are located in utils folder.  
Most of the project can be publicly found on Github 
(https://github.com/aleksandertsg/IBMSWallet)  
 
Figure 12 Prototype project structure 
 
 
4.4 Main functionality 
In this section we will have an overview of smart contract, utilities and Dapp. These are the 
core components that interacts with each other according to the specification in section 0. 
The following sections will show fragments of the code and its functionality. 
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4.4.1 Smart contract 
Main functionality of IBMultiSigWallet.sol file (other functions are not shown): 
 
contract IBMultiSigWallet { 
  ... 
  constructor (bytes memory oModulus, bytes memory oExponent, uint id, address 
_approver, bytes memory aModulus, bytes memory aExponent) {...} 
 
  function initiateTransfer(address payable receiver, uint256 value) {...} 
  function signTransaction(uint transactionId, bytes memory signature, bytes32 
messageHash, bytes memory message) {...} 
  function approveTransaction(uint transactionId, bytes memory signature) {...} 
  function executeTransaction(uint transactionId) {...}    
  function verify(bytes32 msg_hash, bytes memory signature, bytes memory m, 
bytes memory e) {...} 
  ... 
} 
Function constructor(…) is used to create new wallet. It takes user certificate modulus, 
exponent, personal id, approver address, approver certificate modulus and exponent. All of 
the arguments are stored in wallet and these values cannot be changed. 
Functions initiateTransfer(…), signTransaction(…), approveTransaction(…) and 
executeTransaction(…) are transaction process methods that represents smart contract tasks 
described in chapter 0. These functions can be executed only in order they are listed. And 
every call is checked for allowance. 
Function verify(…) is verifying signature against message hash using RSASSA-PKCS1-
V1_5 standard. This function uses external SolRsaVerify.sol contract to make the calculation 
(Massanet, 2018). 
 
4.4.2 Utilities 
The main functionality of the utilities is to handle cryptographical calculations and 
perform data transferring and processing in Dapp. 
File smartIdUtil.js contains function:  
request = async (type, docID, hash, hashType = 'SHA256', displayText) => {...} 
Function request(…) makes HTTP request to Smart-ID and waits for signature response. It 
performs two requests to get the value, as described in section 3.3.3. 
File cryptoUtil.js has three functions that are needed to perform cryptographic calculations 
for signature and data: 
getPublicKey = (cert) => {...} 
 
getDataHash = (hashType = 'sha512', data = secureRandom(64)) => {...} 
 
calcVerifyCode = async (buf) => {...} 
Function getPublicKey(…) is parsing exponent and modulus values out of given certificate 
hash. These values are passed to contract while user registers new IBMSW contract. 
Function getDataHash(…) calculates base64 value of data after hashing with specified 
hashType. 
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Function calcVerifyCode(…) used data to calculate verification code that is displayed on 
Smartphone and Dapp while authentication or signing operation from Smart-ID is requested. 
4.4.3 Dapp prototype 
In Figure 13 we can see Dapp user interface application that helps to interact with IBMSW 
contract and Smart-ID. Using that interface, we can validate sign up and transaction TO-BE 
processes from chapter 0.  
 
 
Figure 13 Dapp prototype user interface 
36 
 
5 Conclusion 
In this work we created an overview of the Ethereum blockchain entities and working 
principles. We analyzed different wallet protection solutions and user identity verification 
and signature services and selected most suitable ones. The requirements for solution were 
listed and checked against current state. We pointed out that none of the requirements were 
fulfilled and continued analyzing existing solutions on more deep level. The outcome of this 
analysis was used to create the solution specification that fulfills all of the requirements. To 
validate the solution specification, we developed a prototype that includes Multisignature 
contract, simple Dapp and additional utilities. As a result, we have a solution specification 
which is successfully validated with the prototype. After the completed work we can answer 
for all of the research questions: 
How to connect the user identity to the wallet in a way that transactions can be made 
only after identity-based signature verification? We created a Multisignature contract 
that holds user’s certificates from Smart-ID service. The transaction is signed using Smart-
ID and certificates are used for transaction validation before execution. 
SQ1 How to make decentralized application know who is making the transactions? 
The transaction cannot be performed without identifying the user, which is connected to 
Smart-ID service through decentralized application. 
SQ2 How to associate an asset transfer with user identity? In our solution, smart contract 
stores a record of transaction with signature that is validated using user certificate given by 
Smart-ID service. 
SQ3 How to integrate state-level identity signing service into the Ethereum 
blockchain? We used a user certificate, that is stored in smart contract and integration with 
Smart-ID service in decentralized application. 
SQ4 How to create a wallet with multiple transaction approval steps? The 
Multisignature wallet is stores two certificates on creation one for the user and one for the 
approver. No transaction can be performed without approver signature. 
SQ5 How to verify identity-based signature in Ethereum blockchain? Each signed 
transaction value is unpacked in smart contract using user’s certificate. The equality of 
extracted value and unsigned transaction value is compared. 
SQ6 How to check that transaction made in the past, was made with valid identity? 
Smart-ID provides an OSCP service that allows to check validity of the certificates at any 
time.  
The limitations of this work were added in the beginning and during the progress: 
• There were no academic papers about national identity connection to blockchain signing 
process found during the research. Source code of examples and non-academic papers 
were used as references.  
• Solution is limited to be used on Ethereum Blockchain, because the smart contract is 
written in solidity language. To use the solution in other Blockchains there is a need to 
rewrite the code in another language.  
• Identity services considered in the solution are national identity verification and signing 
services of Estonia.  
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• To enable more countries to use the solution additional integration is needed. As 
limitation of this thesis, user wallet private key security was not taken into account. Main 
focus was to create solution model considering requirements and prototype of smart 
contract and Dapp.  
• In prototype we used simply hard coded approver certificates, because the focus is to 
make it possible to work. Providing approver certificates  
The outcome of the thesis answers all of the research questions and fulfills the requirements, 
however we highlight some points for future work: 
• Add possibility to have multiple approvers. 
• Implement service that retrieves approver certificates on new contract creation. 
• Create possibility for user to use multiple certificates. 
• Implement error handling for execution failures. 
• Create tests for smart contract 
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